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I. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2011, a twelve-year-old middle school student in Minnesota was 
disciplined due to three postings on her Facebook wall.1 In the first posting, the 
student expressed her dislike for an employee at the middle school;2 in the sec-
ond, the student expressed her interest in discovering the identity of the person 
who “told on her” for writing the first posting; in the third, the student engaged 
in a conversation with a male student about “sexual topics”.3 The student made 
each Facebook posting outside of school hours and from her home.4 School 
officials confirmed this information in a disturbing manner by threatening the 
student with disciplinary action unless she provided them with her usernames 
and passwords for her email and Facebook accounts.5 
 “Forced Consent”6  social media policies of schools and universities 
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 1 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 
1132–33 (D. Minn. 2012). 
 2 Id. at 1133. 
 3 Id. at 1133-34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (More specifically, the student 
wrote, “I want to know who the f&$# [sic] told on me.”). 
 4 Id. at 1133. 
 5 Id. at 1133-34 (School officials initially received the information regarding the first 
two posts from a tip. Then, school officials learned of the third posting from the guardian of 
the male student engaged in the online conversation with R.S. and subsequently confirmed 
the information by demanding the student’s Facebook password.). 
 6 “Forced Consent,” as used in this Comment, originates from an article discussing 
how the California Supreme Court’s review of a lower court forced a juror to consent to 
allowing his Facebook postings to be disclosed to the parties to the case. See Cindy Cohn & 
John Eisenberg, EFF Asks Supreme Court to Reverse “Forced Consent” to Facebook Dis-
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have required students to give officials access to students’ personal social me-
dia accounts.7 In some instances, school officials require students to obey a 
school administrator’s demand for access to social media accounts to investi-
gate an allegation of misconduct.8 In other instances, application of these poli-
cies is not triggered by actual misconduct, but by the school’s eagerness to 
maintain a positive reputation regarding the character and conduct of its stu-
dents. 9  Secondary and postsecondary educational institutions’ use of these 
practices raises significant legal questions,10 as the practices conflict with a 
person’s fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of expression.11 Privacy 
rights trace their roots to the common law principle “that the individual shall 
have full protection in person and in property.”12 Over time, the scope of this 
principle broadened, developing into the right to be left alone, and the term 
“property” grew to comprise both tangible and intangible forms of posses-
                                                                                                              
closure, EFF (Jul. 31, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/1bTfSYH. According to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, consent under Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence must be voluntarily given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 
(1973). Thus, consent is involuntary when it the product of “duress or coercion, expressed 
or implied.” Id.; see, e.g., Lysander Spooner, Forced Consent (1873) (discussing the prob-
lems of an American government that forces its citizens to support it, rather than to do so 
voluntarily) (“The idea that, although government should rest on the consent of the gov-
erned, yet so much force may nevertheless be employed as may be necessary to produce that 
consent, embodies everything that was ever exhibited in the shape of usurpation and tyranny 
in any country on earth.”). 
 7 See also David L. Hudson, Jr., Site Unseen: Schools, Bosses Barred from Eyeing 
Students’, Workers’ Social Media, A.B.A. J. 22 (Nov. 2012) (noting that both schools and 
“[m]any universities require students to let officials access their social media, and in some 
cases impel students to install spying software. Some colleges force their student-athletes to 
consent to the monitoring of their” social media accounts); see, e.g., Minnewaska Area Sch. 
Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (discussing how school officials forced a student to 
log-in to her social media account so they could monitor the account). 
 8 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22. Indeed, this was the case with the twelve-year-old 
student, where school officials sought her username and password after the officials learned 
of her Facebook posts. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. 
 9 See Kellie Woodhouse, University of Michigan Athletes Sign Social Media Policy in 
Bid to Avoid Controversy As Twitter Incidents Multiply, THE ANN ARBOR NEWS (Oct. 29, 
2012, 5:47 AM), http://commcns.org/1gFcCYA (discussing comments from University of 
Michigan’s football coach on how the school wants its players to represent the program); 
see also Bob Sullivan, Govt. Agencies, Colleges Demand Applicants’ Facebook Passwords, 
NBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/1fA5JVf (observing that col-
leges have begun to request applicants’ social media log-in information during interviews). 
 10 See Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22 (“There are multiple incidents around the country 
where schools are invading the social media privacy rights of K-12 students.”). 
 11 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333–34 (1985) (holding that students have the 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969) (recognizing students’ fundamental right to 
freedom of expression). 
 12 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193 (1890). 
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sion.13 Arguably, a person’s privacy rights now encompass his or her right to 
control access to personal social media accounts.14 Notably, a person’s right of 
free expression originates from the United States Constitution and has devel-
oped to “allow free trade in ideas.”15 
In today’s society, social media plays an integral role in our everyday 
lives—from emails between friends to social network postings that detail the 
activities of someone’s day.16 A few types of social networks that are popular 
among students, both in secondary and postsecondary education, are Face-
book,17 Twitter,18 and Instagram.19 Social network sites have privacy policies 
and terms and conditions for users, giving them the “the ability to control how 
their information is shared.”20 However, the degree of privacy each of these 
social networks recognizes varies depending on the networks’ privacy poli-
cies.21 
In general, courts will uphold “forced consent” policies over the student’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy when the school’s teachers and administra-
tors have a substantial interest “in maintaining discipline in the classroom and 
on school grounds.”22 Supporters of forced consent policies argue that the poli-
cies help monitor criminal and other types of conduct that negatively reflect 
the educational institution.23 On the other hand, opponents of these administra-
tive practices argue that these policies violate students’ privacy rights.24 These 
                                                
 13 Id. 
 14 Connie Davis Powell, Privacy for Social Networking, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 689, 692 (2012). 
 15 Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From 
the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 1017 
(2008) (internal quotations omitted). 
 16 Nir Orr, Modern Social Media and Information Transmission Problems, IHLS (Dec. 
23, 2012), http://commcns.org/1dXfNmh (“Today’s social media has become the play-
ground of nearly every person in the world.”). 
 17 See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA AND MOBILE INTERNET USE AMONG 
TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 3 (Feb. 3, 2010), available at 
http://commcns.org/MpCF83. 
 18 Jim Edwards, Facebook is No Longer the Most Popular Social Network For Teens, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2013), available at http://commcns.org/1n6G5Z2. 
 19 See MAEVE DUGGAN & JOANNA BRENNER, THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
USERS—2012, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 6 (Feb. 14, 2013), available at 
http://commcns.org/1bTgAoO. 
 20 Connie Davis Powell, “You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get over It!” Would Warren 
and Brandeis Argue for Privacy for Social Networking?, 31 PACE L. REV. 146, 165 (2011). 
 21 Powell, supra note 20, at 165–67. 
 22 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 
1143 (D. Minn. 2012) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23 Ian Hanner, Universities Force Student-Athletes to Reveal Their Facebook Pass-
words, THE COLLEGE FIX (Mar. 29, 2012), http://commcns.org/1eLlaGd. 
 24 Scott G. McNealy, What Are Privacy Interests? You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get 
over It, HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK § 10:5, at 361 (Alice G. Gosfield, ed., 2012) (discussing 
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“forced consent” policies have been challenged as unreasonable searches that 
infringe upon a student’s freedom of expression, in violation of the First and 
Fourth Amendments.25 
This Comment argues that social media policies in secondary and postsec-
ondary schools that allow school officials to request or demand students to 
consent to their social media accounts being accessed or monitored violate the 
First and Fourth Amendments.26 This Comment also argues that state legisla-
tures in California and Delaware should enact statutes that would ban social 
media policies in educational institutions that force students to consent to dis-
closing social network account information.27 Furthermore, this Comment ar-
gues that judicial review is necessary to determine the constitutionality of these 
social media policies.28 
Part II focuses on the origins of a person’s right to privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment and how its interpretation has developed from English common 
law into the modern view. In addition, Part II will focus on the First Amend-
ment’s freedom of expression history. Part III briefly examines various forms 
of social networks that are popular amongst students in secondary and postsec-
ondary educational institutions. Part III also examines how these social net-
works recognize the rights of users in keeping personal information from being 
involuntarily disclosed to third parties. Part IV of this Comment explores the 
different types of social media policies forcing students to disclose social net-
work account information that have been reported in secondary and postsec-
ondary schools. Part IV also discusses the consequences of students’ failure to 
consent to these policies. Part V investigates the modern views from supporters 
and opponents of social media policies. Part VI discusses how policies that 
force students to consent to monitoring of their social media accounts are 
flawed. Part VII suggests that state legislators should enact and amend statutes 
                                                                                                              
the societal values surrounding privacy rights, as well as the work of privacy advocates); 
Hanner, supra note 23. 
 25 Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1133 (“Plaintiffs argue that 
the punishment of [the student’s] out-of-school wall postings violated her First Amendment 
right to free speech . . . [and that] the officials’ . . . search of [the student’s] private Face-
book account constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.”). Pertinently, 
the First Amendment to the Constitution holds that, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourth Amendment states, in 
pertinent part, that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches . . . shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
These Amendments apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV § 1. 
 26 See discussion infra Part VI. 
 27 See discussion infra Part VII; see also Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22; Dina Abou 
Salem, California First to Endorse Comprehensive Social Media Privacy Law, ABC NEWS 
(Dec. 27, 2012, 3:50 PM), http://commcns.org/LFzKIv. 
 28 See discussion infra Part VII. 
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to prohibit the monitoring of students by these means. In addition, Part VII 
suggests that the judicial system should determine whether these forced con-
sent policies are constitutional. Part VIII discusses the importance of uniform 
legislation and how the proposed amendment to current privacy statutes will 
provide students with broader protection. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
It is important to discuss how the rights to privacy and freedom of expres-
sion have developed before analyzing the use of forced consent policies in ed-
ucational institutions under the First and Fourth Amendments. Although the 
breadth of a person’s rights to privacy and free expression have expanded over 
time, both rights trace their roots back to common law principles.29 
A. Right to Privacy under the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches . . . 
shall not be violated.”30 One of the key purposes of the Amendment is to pro-
tect the privacy of an individual.31 The right to privacy originates from the 
common law principle “that the individual shall have full protection in person 
and in property.”32 However, scholars have taken note of the necessity to rede-
fine the extent of such protection to meet developing changes in society.33 
In his concurrence in Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan articulated a two-
pronged test in determining whether a person is protected under the Fourth 
Amendments from unreasonable searches: (1) that a person has a subjective 
expectation of privacy; and (2) that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’34 In United States v. Jones, the Supreme 
                                                
 29 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 198 (“The common law secures to each 
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to others.”); Jay, supra note 15, at 783 (“Comparing the 
current body of First Amendment law, there is a radical difference in outlook regarding 
freedom of expression between the eighteenth and the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries.”). 
 30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 31 Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 312-
13 (2010). 
 32 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 193. 
 33 Powell, supra note 14, at 690; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 193 (Warren and 
Brandeis recognized that “[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of 
new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of socie-
ty.”). 
 34 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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Court reaffirmed a statement by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in 
Katz: a search is a government intrusion into a constitutionally protected area 
where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy for the purpose of obtaining 
information.35 Moreover, the Court held that trespass alone does not equal a 
search, but it must be conjoined with an attempt to find or to obtain some-
thing.36 
Furthermore, in R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 
the district court interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in New Jersey v. 
T.L.O. as establishing that students “enjoy a Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures by school officials.”37 In T.L.O., 
an assistant vice principal demanded that a student hand her purse to him, after 
that student had denied smoking in a school restroom.38 Next, the administrator 
reached into the purse for the cigarettes, noticed rolling papers—which he as-
sociated with marijuana use—and, as a result, conducted a thorough search of 
the purse, revealing drug-related paraphernalia and marijuana.39 Although the 
Court found that the search of the student’s purse for cigarettes by school offi-
cials was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,40 the Court conclud-
ed that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions extend to searches conducted by 
public school officials.41 Further, the T.L.O. Court recognized that a “search of 
a child’s person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person . . . is 
undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy,” and the 
court was willing to recognize such expectations as reasonable.42 
B. Freedom of Expression under the First Amendment 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution declares that “Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”43 At the time of 
the First Amendment’s enactment, America’s legal tradition “was not generous 
toward the rights of speakers . . . especially not if their words were critical of 
                                                
 35 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012). 
 36 Id. at 951 n.5. It should also be noted that, “situations involving merely the transmis-
sion of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Id. at 
953. 
 37 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 
1141 (D. Minn. 2012). 
 38 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 346–47. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 337–39. The T.L.O. Court recognized that students could have legitimate priva-
cy interests in “nondisruptive yet highly personal items such as photographs, letters, and 
diaries” that they carry in their “purses or wallets.” Id. at 339. 
 43 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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the government or its officials.” 44  More specifically, the First Amendment 
sought to protect those who voiced their criticism “of the government or its 
officials.”45 However, these protections did not extend to publications of in-
formation deemed “improper” or “illegal.”46 For instance, English common law 
did not offer protection for various forms of speech classified as sedition.47 
This tradition carried over to the United States during its formation and its 
adoption of the First Amendment, and also included profanity, blasphemy, and 
speech that “had ‘a bad tendency’ to cause crime.”48 As an illustration, “[t]he 
protection of free speech would not protect a man [in] falsely shouting fire in a 
theatre and causing panic.”49 
The First Amendment has been interpreted “to guard the interests of both the 
speaker in disseminating information and the listener in receiving it.”50 It also 
prevents the government from prohibiting speech or expressive conduct despite 
disapproval of the expressed ideas.51 The Supreme Court has recognized the 
importance of freedom of expression as it “may contribute to society’s edifica-
tion.”52 Moreover, the Court has held that the “right to receive information and 
ideas, regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free society.”53 
This protection has also been extended to public educational institutions in that 
school officials cannot have absolute control over these fundamental rights of 
students.54 For example, as long as a student’s ideas and expressions do not 
substantially or materially interfere with school activities or the rights of oth-
ers, those ideas and expressions are protected under the First Amendment.55 
                                                
 44 See Jay, supra note 15, at 783. 
 45 Id. 
 46 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *151-52; see 
also Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism 
of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 13 (2011) (noting that “in colonial-era 
American law . . . largely accepted [Blackstone’s] view of the power to punish expression 
thought to be harmful.”). 
 47 Jay, supra note 15, at 783. 
 48 Id. at 784 (“Every state at the time of the First Amendment was adopted outlawed 
either blasphemy or profanity . . . [m]ore generally, speech that had ‘a bad tendency’ to 
cause crime, disorders or immoral acts could be punished.”). 
 49 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919). 
 50 Jay, supra note 15, at 1018. 
 51 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 6. 
51 Jay, supra note 15, at 1018 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also First Nat’l Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). 
 53 Id. at 1018 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 54 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (“Students 
in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They are possessed 
of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect 
their obligations to the State.”). 
 55 Id. at 513–14. 
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III. AN EXAMINATION OF MODERN SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Social networks are “interactive web sites that connect users based on com-
mon interests and that allow subscribers to personalize individual web sites.”56 
In more recent years, social networks have become a popular and highly rec-
ognized tool for the everyday Internet user.57 These social networks allow indi-
viduals to express and interact with one another in a variety of ways, spanning 
from “aimless chatter to the exchange of offensive and obscene materials.”58 In 
addition, social networks offer ways of “meaningful and important exchanges 
among diverse parties.”59 For instance, continued popularity of these social 
media websites has attracted companies to use them to reach consumers.60 Alt-
hough users of these networks share information with others, they still want to 
maintain control over the information that is shared.61 A few of the more popu-
lar social networks and their privacy capabilities are discussed below. 
A. Twitter 
Twitter.com (“Twitter”) is a social network that provides information in re-
al-time relating to ideas, opinions, and news about what the user finds interest-
ing.62 Twitter enables users to find other accounts and follow those conversa-
                                                
 56 John S. Wilson, Myspace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in Electronic 
Evidence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2007). There is no clear definition for social net-
works. Nathan Petrashek, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of Online So-
cial Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2010). However, the Western District of 
Texas has defined it as a website that “allows its members to create online ‘profiles,’ which 
are individual web pages on which members post photographs, videos, and information 
about their lives and interests. The idea of online social networking is that members will use 
their online profiles to become part of an online community of people with common inter-
ests.” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845–46 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
 57 Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Prom-
ises of User-Generated Information Flows, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
741, 742, 749 (2008). 
 58 Id. at 742. “Social networks include web-based sites such as Facebook, Google Buzz, 
MySpace, LinkedIn, and Twitter, which allow users to register with the service, create a 
profile, view and post content on other users’ pages, send messages, establish and join social 
groups, invite members to events, and search for other members using the same network and 
connect with those members.” Powell, supra note 14, at 690. 
 59 Zarsky, supra note 57, at 742. 
 60 Id. at 749; see also MICHAEL A. STELZNER, 2013 SOCIAL MEDIA MARKETING INDUS-
TRY REPORT: HOW MARKETERS ARE USING SOCIAL MEDIA TO GROW BUSINESS 17 (2013), 
available at http://commcns.org/1n6GdaN. 
 61 Powell, supra note 14, at 692; see also Bob Sullivan, Facebook Users Want More 
Privacy, But Are Nudged Towards Less, Study Says, NBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2013), 
http://commcns.org/1aUG8Hl. 
 62 About, TWITTER, http://commcns.org/1cLNZpC (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). 
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tions as well.63 When the user posts a message on Twitter, those bursts of in-
formation are called tweets, which are limited to 140 characters.64 However, 
users are not limited to just posting ideas and opinions; they may also post 
photos and videos directly.65 
Twitter’s privacy policy states “that its [s]ervices are primarily designed to 
help [users] share information with the world[,] while cautioning its users to 
[k]eep in mind that although [they] may consider certain information to be pri-
vate, not all postings of such information may be a violation of this policy.”66 
Although the default setting for a user’s Twitter account is a publicly viewable 
setting, the user can change the settings “to make the information more pri-
vate.”67 
B. Facebook 
Facebook.com (“Facebook”) is an online social network where “[u]sers 
share personal information, pictures, and comments with their friends and fol-
lowers and post status updates which provide up-to-the-minute details about 
their daily activity.”68 Similar to Twitter, this information can be seen by any-
one depending on the privacy setting of the user’s Facebook account.69 Moreo-
ver, Facebook provides an option allowing “users to choose who can view their 
profile, find them in a search, or see their personal information.”70 
C. Instagram 
Instagram.com (“Instagram”) is a picture-sharing social network,71 allowing 
users to alter pictures using different filters prior to sharing those pictures.72 To 
share a photo, a user need only take the photo with his or her mobile phone and 
then upload it.73 
                                                
 63 Id.; see also Help Center: Finding People on Twitter, TWITTER, 
http://commcns.org/1j4qKux (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
 64 TWITTER, supra note 62. 
 65 Id.; see also Carrie-Ann Skinner, How to Upload Images to Twitter, PC ADVISOR 
(June 8, 2011), http://commcns.org/1aUGm17. 
 66 Powell, supra note 14, at 692-93. 
 67 Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, http://commcns.org/1aUGnCk (last visited Aug. 22, 
2013). 
 68 Powell, supra note 20, 163. 
 69 Sharing and Finding You on Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://commcns.org/1cLOjod 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2013). 
 70 Powell, supra note 20, at 165. 
 71 FAQ, INSTAGRAM, http://commcns.org/1cLOlfJ (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
 72 Marie-Andrée Weiss, Friends with Commercial Benefits: Social Media Users Do Not 
Want Their Likeness Used in Advertisements, 16 J. INTERNET L. 1, 8 (2013). 
 73 INSTAGRAM, supra note 71. 
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An Instagram user is also able to control his or her privacy settings.74 When 
the user first joins the social network, all the photos are visible “to anyone us-
ing Instagram or on the Instagram.com website.”75 However, the user may elect 
to make his or her account private.76 When the account is private, the user must 
approve all “follow requests” of other individuals that wish to view the user’s 
account.77 In addition, this privacy function allows only those people who fol-
low the user on Instagram to see the user’s photos.78 Therefore, when users set 
their account settings to private, thereby restricting public access,79 they have 
evidenced an expectation that only those individuals allowed to “follow” them 
can see the contents of their Instagram account. 
IV. PRIVACY AND EXPRESSION: ISSUES IN THE 
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
Social media networks often provoke controversy regarding the permissibil-
ity of students to share comments and photos on social media pages.80 The 
Courts have already determined that students possess these rights;81 however, 
those rights can be limited in schools under certain circumstances.82 However, 
                                                
 74 Id.; see also Larry Magid, Teens and Tweens Flock to Instagram What Parents Need 
to Know (Updated), SAFEKIDS.COM, http://commcns.org/1ibcX1N (last updated May 2013). 
 75 INSTAGRAM, supra note 71; see also Magid, supra note 74. 
 76 INSTAGRAM, supra note 71; see also Jam Kotenko, Privacy Advocates Say Instagram 
Is Unsafe for Underage Users, DIGITAL TRENDS (May 16, 2013), 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/keep-our-underage-children-safe-instagram-
concerned-parents/. 
 77 INSTAGRAM, supra note 71; see also Kotenko, supra note 76. 
 78 INSTAGRAM, supra note 71; see How Do I Set My Photos So That Only Approved 
Followers Can See Them?, INSTAGRAM, http://commcns.org/1ilTWdI (last visited Sept. 6, 
2013). 
 79 Privacy Policy, INSTAGRAM, http://commcns.org/LpZCHD (last visited Aug. 23, 
2013) (“Any information or content that you voluntarily disclose for posting to the Service, 
such as User Content, becomes available to the public, as controlled by any applicable pri-
vacy settings that you set.”). 
 80 See, e.g., Alice Park, Are Med-Student Tweets Breaching Patient Privacy?, TIME, 
Sept. 23, 2009, available at http://commcns.org/1ejuDK3 (“Younger [medical] students 
were more likely than older staff members to believe that their thoughts and opinions were 
valid to post online, regardless of their potentially damaging or discriminatory impact on 
others.”); Jaime Sarrio & Emily Bazar, Student’s Expulsion Feeds Debate On Online Rights, 
USA TODAY (Feb. 3, 2010, 1:31 PM), http://commcns.org/1ilU3Gg (“The expulsion of a 
high school basketball player who posted angry messages on Facebook highlights a growing 
debate over students’ privacy and free-speech rights online.”); Sarah Mui, Cyberbullying 
Law Would Violate Students’ Free Speech, Opponents Say, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://commcns.org/1j4rFva (noting the constitutional concerns raised by an Indiana bill that 
gives school officials the ability to punish a student for that student’s online comments). 
 81 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 
1143–44 (D. Minn. 2012). 
 82 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (“It is evident that the school setting 
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the way schools and their social media policies have begun to thwart these 
constitutionally protected rights is troubling.83 
A. Secondary Schools 
As seen in R.S. ex rel. S.S., other public schools have been enforcing similar 
social media policies.84 In some cases, school officials learn that a student may 
have inappropriate material on a social media site.85 To avoid potential issues 
of “bullying and other possible ramifications at school,” school officials would 
call that student into their office and force the student to reveal his or her 
password; the student suspected of inappropriate material would be instructed 
to “log onto the site and show [the school officials] the questionable online 
content.”86 If the student fails to cooperate with the school officials’ demand 
then he or she might be threatened with further discipline87 or may be pressured 
into complying.88 
B. Postsecondary Schools 
Forced consent policies do not end with primary and secondary schools. In 
addition, “forced consent” policies are also enforced by public universities and 
are a growing concern.89 Some universities require college students to grant 
school officials access to their social media accounts;90 more worrisome are 
those universities that force their students to turn over their login information 
to such accounts.91 
                                                                                                              
requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinari-
ly subject.”) 
 83 See Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1134 (discussing how 
school officials forced a student to log in to her social media account so they could moni-
tor); see also Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22 (observing that many universities require stu-
dents to allow school officials to access their social media accounts). 
 84 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22; Bob Sullivan, School Officials’ Facebook Rummag-
ing Prompts Mom’s Privacy Crusade, NBC NEWS (May 18, 2012, 6:10 AM), 
http://commcns.org/1lvX0Zw. 
 85 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1135 (“When [the stu-
dent] hesitated and stated that she did not remember her passwords, the officials called her a 
liar and threatened her with detention if she did not give them her passwords.”) 
 88 See Sullivan, supra note 84 (discussing how students are told that they could not 
leave the school official’s room until they revealed “their passwords or unlock their phones 
and allow school officials to browse their personal information”). 
 89 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Alissa Del Riego et al., Your Password Or Your Paycheck?: A Job Applicant’s Murky 
Right to Social Media Privacy, 3 J. INTERNET L. 1, 18–19 (2012) (“Recently, there have 
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University athletic departments are particularly interested in monitoring 
their student-athletes. At some colleges, such as the University of North Caro-
lina, school officials force their student-athletes to consent to the monitoring of 
their social network accounts by signing a social media policy.92 The social 
media policy at University of North Carolina states: “Each team must identify 
at least one coach or administrator who is responsible for having access to and 
regularly monitoring the content of team members’ social networking sites and 
posting.”93 In addition, it states that “[t]he athletics department also reserves 
the right to have other staff members monitor athletes.”94 When dealing with a 
social network such as Facebook, this policy requires a student to accept a 
friend request of “a coach or compliance officer, giving that person access to 
their ‘friends-only’ posts.”95 
However, University of North Carolina is not alone in its policies when 
dealing with student-athletes.96 The University of Michigan also requires its 
student-athletes to sign a social media policy.97 The policy identifies, for the 
student-athlete, what the University deems an appropriate use of social media 
accounts, as well as the disciplinary actions that a student will face, should the 
student’s account violate the policy.98 The “severity of the discipline will be 
based on the seriousness of the infraction,” and range from “[a] conference 
with the student-athlete’s coach and/or sport administrator to discuss the in-
fraction,” to the student’s removal from the team.99 Other schools implement 
their social media policies in other ways such as banning student-athletes from 
using specific words on Twitter, or banning students from using Twitter alto-
gether.100 Some schools use social media monitoring companies for around the 
                                                                                                              
been several reports of employers in the United States requesting [sic] job candidates for 
access to their Facebook accounts before making a hiring decision. Denial of this request 
can be tantamount to an application withdrawal, forcing candidates to decide between their 
privacy and their prospective employment.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 9; Hudson, Jr., 
supra note 7, at 22. 
 92 Hanner, supra note 23; see also Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22. As noted above, this 
practice extends to job applicants. Michelle Singletary, Would You Give Potential Employ-
ers Your Facebook Password, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2012), http://commcns.org/1ilUnov. 
 93 Sullivan, supra note 9. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Pete Thamel, Tracking Twitter, Raising Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2012, at D1, 
D5 (noting that other universities, like Oklahoma and Nebraska, also monitor their athletes’ 
online profiles). 
 97 University of Michigan: Athletics Social Media Policy, THE ANN ARBOR NEWS (Oct. 
9, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/1nGthvo (“Student-athletes are required to notify 
the Athletics Department of any social media accounts they maintain.”). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Woodhouse, supra note 9. 
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clock surveillance.101 
These practices are becoming more common in today’s society generally,102 
as even some employers utilize forced consent policies. For instance, some 
employers request that job seekers log in to their social media accounts during 
interviews and allow an interviewer to view their content while the applicant 
“clicks through wall posts, friends, photos and anything else that might be 
found behind the privacy wall.”103 Though these practices may be seen as vol-
untary, college applicants, similar to job seekers, only agree to these requests 
in hopes of a favorable outcome.104 Just as a job seeker hopes to be employed, a 
college applicant similarly hopes to be accepted.105 
V. MODERN VIEWS ON PRIVACY RIGHTS OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA USAGE IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
Social media policies that force students to disclose social network account 
information have their share of proponents and critics. Each side has concluded 
that its stance and concerns on the issue should be given more weight than the 
other.106 
A. Supporters of “Forced Consent” Policies 
Although “forced consent” are unfavorable among students and their par-
ents,107 these policies still have strong advocates.108 In secondary education in-
                                                
 101 Jamie P. Hopkins et al., Being Social: Why the NCAA Has Forced Universities to 
Monitor Student-Athletes’ Social Media, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 39-40 (2013); 
see also Woodhouse, supra note 9; Catherine Ho, Companies Tracking College Athletes’ 
Tweets, Facebook Posts Go after Local Universities, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2011, at A16; 
see also Sullivan, supra note 9 (“Schools are also turning to social media monitoring com-
panies with names like UDilligence and Varsity Monitor for software packages that auto-
mate the task. The programs offer a ‘reputation scoreboard’ to coaches and send ‘threat 
level’ warnings about individual athletes to compliance officers.”). 
 102 Joanna Stern, Demanding Facebook Passwords May Break Law, Say Senators, ABC 
NEWS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://commcns.org/MpDjma. 
 103 Sullivan, supra note 9. 
 104 Id. (“While submitting to a Facebook review is voluntary, virtually all applicants 
agree to it out of a desire to score well in the interview.”). 
 105 See Riego et al., supra note 91, at 18-19 (discussing how employers “ask or obtain 
access” to a candidate’s social media account). “Denial of this request can be tantamount to 
an application withdrawal, forcing candidates to decide between their privacy and their pro-
spective employment.” Id. 
 106 Sullivan, supra note 9. 
 107 Sullivan, supra note 84 (discussing a mother’s disapproval and the effect of school 
conduct on her daughter). 
 108 See Press Release, Kaplan Test Prep, Kaplan Test Prep Survey Finds That College 
Admissions Officers’ Discovery of Online Material Damaging to Applicants Nearly Triples 
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stitutions, school officials argue that forcing students to provide them with 
their social network account information furthers a legitimate interest in main-
taining discipline in the classroom.109 Administrators argue that schools should 
monitor what students are doing at any point in time.110 Other concerns include 
bullying,111 cyber-bullying,112 and drug trafficking.113 Supporters also argue that 
in some cases, students volunteer to allow school officials to see the content of 
the students’ social media accounts before the school official has even asked.114 
School officials in postsecondary schools have concerns similar to employ-
ers who request applicants to allow them access to social media account pro-
files.115 Employers argue that they have a legitimate interest in obtaining as 
much information on the applicant as possible.116 In their view, a job appli-
cant’s poor reputation or questionable behavior may have a negative impact on 
the employer’s reputation.117 Employers use the applicant’s social media ac-
count profile to provide a picture of the applicant’s personality and character.118 
Just as employers take special interest in gaining insight into the character of 
an applicant “to assess whether contracting the applicant would be in the or-
ganization’s best interest,”119 so do universities in deciding whether to accept a 
college applicant.120 
Supporters of “forced consent” in colleges rationalize the policy of monitor-
ing the social media accounts of student-athletes with the ruling in Vernonia 
School District 47J v. Acton.121 In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a school 
district’s policy requiring student-athletes to be subjected to drug testing in 
                                                                                                              
in a Year (Oct. 4, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/1ibex3A (noting that in the field of 
college admissions, “the traditional application – the essays, the letters of recommendation – 
represent the polished version of an applicant, while often what’s found online is a rawer 
version of that applicant,” and discussing findings of essay plagiarism, vulgarities in blogs, 
alcohol consumption, and ‘illegal activities.’”) 
 109 See R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 
1143 (D. Minn. 2012). 
 110 Hanner, supra note 23. 
 111 Jamie P. Hopkins et al., supra note 105, at 30. 
 112 See, e.g., Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 622 (citing an example definition of “bullying” 
to include actions taken by electronic means from LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 
416.13(C)(2) (2010) (West, Westlaw through 2012), amended by LA. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 
416.13(C)(1)(b) (2012)). 
 113 Sullivan, supra note 84. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Riego et al., supra note 91, at 18. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See Kaplan Test Prep, supra note 108. 
 121 Hanner, supra note 23; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 
(1995). 
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order to participate in school sports.122 Under Vernonia, supporters of these 
social media policies argue, “students are not obligated to join a college sports 
team and as such, can be asked to forfeit certain rights for the ‘privilege’ of 
playing.”123 Additionally, universities argue that online monitoring practices 
ensure student-athletes “are not excessively trash-talking other teams or com-
mitting crimes that could reflect poorly on the institution.”124 
B. Opponents of “Forced Consent” Policies 
Critics of these policies do not share the same understanding as the school 
officials that endorse them.125 They argue that these administrative practices, in 
both secondary and postsecondary schools, requiring students to allow school 
officials to access or monitor their social media accounts violate the students’ 
right to privacy.126 Simply put, they view these policies as a way of spying on 
students.127 Opponents further argue that “forced consent” policies constitute an 
unreasonable search and therefore violate the students’ freedom of expression 
under the First and Fourth Amendments.128 Although a student may voluntarily 
allow a school official to view his/her social media accounts in some circum-
stances, in other cases, the student is under duress from fear of disciplinary 
actions.129 
Regarding student-athletes in postsecondary schools, critics do not agree 
with the view that these social media policies should be treated similarly to 
drug testing, which the court has upheld in school athletics.130 For instance, 
Bradley Shear, an attorney and adjunct professor at The George Washington 
University, makes a distinction between the two policies.131 Shear contends 
“[t]he difference between drug testing cases and [social media policies] is that 
in drug testing, a school is looking at illegal substances.”132 However, “[h]ere 
                                                
 122 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 664-65. 
 123 Hanner, supra note 23. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22 (noting lawmakers have introduced legislation to 
protect students’ First and Fourth Amendment rights). 
 126 Hanner, supra note 23. 
 127 Sullivan, supra note 9 (arguing that “schools are in the business of educating, not 
spying”). 
 128 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 
1133 (D. Minn. 2012) (plaintiffs in this action alleged violations of First and Fourth 
Amendment rights); U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 129 See Sullivan, supra note 84 (discussing how students are told that they cannot leave 
the school officials’ room until they have revealed their passwords or unlocked their phones 
for inspection). 
 130 Hanner, supra note 23. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
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you’re looking at inappropriate conduct. It’s comparing apples to oranges.”133 
Furthermore, there are concerns that if public universities have a right to access 
student-athletes private social media account posts, “then what will stop [pub-
lic universities] from claiming a right to access and monitor private email ac-
counts, voicemail messages, etc . . . and installing eavesdropping equipment 
into off-campus apartments?”134 
VI. POLICIES THAT FORCE STUDENTS TO CONSENT TO 
MONITORING OF THEIR STUDENT MEDIA ACCOUNTS 
ARE FLAWED 
Despite the possible good intentions of practitioners of “forced consent” pol-
icies, these policies violate the First and Fourth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution.135  Moreover, students have a protected interest in the con-
tents of their social media accounts. 
A. Violation of Students’ Privacy Rights 
The social media policies that make students consent to the access or moni-
toring of their social media accounts constitute an unreasonable search and 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and are, therefore, unconstitutional.136 A 
search under the Fourth Amendment is a governmental intrusion into a consti-
tutionally protected area where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
with the intent to obtain information.137 In public schools, school officials are 
agents of the State.138 Thus, when public school officials demand a student to 
reveal his or her login information for their private social media accounts to 
allow school officials to access, monitor, and obtain information, those offi-
cials are conducting a search.139 
                                                
 133 Id. 
 134 Bradley Shear, UNIV. OF NORTH CAROLINA’S STUDENT-ATHLETE SOCIAL MEDIA POLI-
CY MAY BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SHEAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA LAW (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://commcns.org/1ibeFA6. 
 135 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (noting a person’s right to freedom of expression); U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV (noting a person’s right to be free from unreasonable searches). 
 136 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 
1142 (D. Minn. 2012). 
 137 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (quoting United States v. Knotts 
460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)). 
 138 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dep. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 503 (1969) (holding that school officials act as representatives 
of the State when carrying out searches). 
 139 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (holding that because the action of the government do not 
consist of a physical trespass, the Jones analysis would not apply and the Katz test would be 
controlling); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (Nevertheless, Justice 
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The Fourth Amendment guarantees students a right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches.140 In other words, a search without a justifiable and legitimate 
government interest violates the Fourth Amendment.141 In determining whether 
a search is reasonable, the court must consider whether the person had a sub-
jective expectation of privacy, and whether that expectation is one that society 
has recognized as reasonable.142 Therefore, in regard to social media content, it 
must be determined that the user has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and 
that the “expectation of privacy (or control by users of information freely dis-
closed) on social network sites” is one that “society is willing to recognize as 
reasonable.” 143  However, the Katz Court made clear that “[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a sub-
ject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”144 
Thus, not only must the student have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
content of their social media accounts, but they must also show that they 
sought to preserve such content as private.145 
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Supreme Court established that consent to 
an involuntary search constitutes an unreasonable search.146 In Schneckloth, the 
court held that to justify a search on the basis of consent, the Fourth Amend-
ment requires that the consent be voluntarily given.147 “Voluntariness is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.”148 Moreo-
ver, the court ruled that consent is not voluntary when it is “not the result of 
duress or coercion, express or implied.”149 
When school officials in secondary schools bring students down to their of-
                                                                                                              
Sotomayor opines: “[we] should not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to 
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
 140 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. 
 141 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 
1142 (D. Minn. 2012) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)). 
 142 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
 143 Powell, supra note 14, at 700; Riego et al., supra note 91, at 18-19 (“The Applicant 
must claim both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy that society recognizes in 
[his or her] social media profile and its contents in order to maintain a claim against the 
prospective employer who surreptitiously or forcefully accessed her profile.”). 
 144 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (citing Rios v 
United States, 364 U.S. 253, 260 (1960)). 
 145 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; Powell, supra note 14, at 699-700 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1989)). 
 146 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220-28 (1973) (“The Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by 
implied threat or covert force.”). 
 147 Id. at 248. 
 148 Id. at 248-49. 
 149 Id. at 249. 
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fice and demand that the students log in to their social media accounts, it is 
sometimes done under the threat of disciplinary action.150 The same can be con-
sidered for college applicants and student-athletes.151 If the student applicant or 
student-athlete fails to disclose their social network credentials, the school may 
penalize them by not accepting the student’s application152 or not allowing the 
student to play on the team.153 In these circumstances, the student’s fear of dis-
ciplinary actions is what controls the consent; the consent is not voluntarily 
given.154 
Commentators have disputed whether users of social media networks and 
accounts have an expectation of privacy in the contents of their accounts.155 As 
discussed previously,156 the default setting for most social media accounts is set 
to public—meaning that when information is posted on the social media site, 
that information can be viewed by any other person who uses the same social 
media site.157 However, many of these social media networks also have privacy 
settings where the user can control what information is disclosed to the public 
and which people can view the user’s account information.158 In those cases, 
                                                
 150 See, e.g., R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 
1128, 1142 (D. Minn. 2012); see also, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 84. 
 151 See University of Michigan: Athletics Social Media Policy, supra note 101 (discuss-
ing disciplinary action taken against a student-athlete if found to be in violation of the Uni-
versity of Michigan’s social media policy). 
 152 See Riego et al., supra note 91, at 19 (discussing how denying the interviewers re-
quest for access to the applicant’s social media account could lead to the withdrawal of an 
application). 
 153 See University of Michigan: Athletics Social Media Policy, supra note 101 (“In the 
event that a student-athlete’s social media account is found to be in violation of the poli-
cy…the athletics department reserves the right to impose discipline which may include one 
or more of the following:…[r]emoving the student-athlete from the team.”). 
 154 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (noting that consent is involun-
tary if the person has been coerced into giving the consent). 
 155 Powell, supra note 20, at 175-78 (“One view is that privacy requires an attempt to 
maintain secrecy of the information,—once information is revealed to others, it is no longer 
private.”). Under the network theory, a person may disclose information on his or her social 
media profile so long as there are parameters in place that limit the information that is 
shared. Id. at 177. Moreover, “a user maintains a privacy interest, even when personal in-
formation is disclosed on a network of users.” Id. at 178. 
 156 See discussion supra Part III. 
 157 Powell, supra note 14, at 692-93 (citations omitted) (discussing how Twitter’s ser-
vices were designed to share information with the world); Sharing and Finding You on Fa-
cebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info-on-fb (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2013) (discussing the public view default setting of Facebook); FAQ, INSTAGRAM, 
http://instagram.com/about/faq/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (discussing the public view de-
fault setting of Instagram). See also Part III of this Comment discussing the privacy settings 
of Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. 
 158 Powell, supra note 14, at 692-93 (citations omitted) (discussing the privacy settings 
for Twitter); Powell, supra note 20, at 165 (discussing the privacy settings for Facebook); 
FAQ, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/faq/ (discussing the privacy settings for Insta-
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the user has intended to preserve the contents of their social media accounts as 
private.159 
Not only do people have an expectation of privacy in the use of social media 
accounts, it is an expectation that society has recognized as reasonable.160 Alt-
hough the public can view the information placed on social media accounts, 
“information should be deemed private if the information stays confined to the 
initial group to which it was disclosed, even if such a group is rather large.”161 
Because users are capable of managing their privacy settings to limit who sees 
their information, the “use of controls provided by social network sites sets a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, albeit limited, for their users.”162 
B. Additional Privacy Rights Violation: How “Forced Consent” Policies 
Fit Within the Special Needs Doctrine 
Although school officials have otherwise asserted,163 schools do not have a 
legitimate interest in searching students’ social media accounts. In dealing with 
privacy interests of employees, the Supreme Court has held that “public em-
ployer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interest of employ-
ees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes . . . should be judged by the 
standard of reasonableness under all circumstances.”164 This “standard of rea-
sonableness” has also been applied to public schools.165 
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court recognized that the school setting “re-
quires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to 
justify a search.”166 In doing so, the Court held that the warrant and probable 
                                                                                                              
gram). 
 159 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). When users set their social media 
accounts to private, only the persons authorized by the user to view their profiles are able to 
view the profile contents. See Powell, supra note 20, at 165 (discussing the privacy capabili-
ties of Facebook). 
 160 Because the contents of a person’s social media account reveals the personal charac-
teristics and lifestyle of the user, “[i]t is unlikely that a prospective employer’s generalized 
search of a job candidate’s [social media] profile to learn more about his personal character-
istics and lifestyle would be deemed reasonable, given the search’s breadth in scope and 
tangential relation to the [school environment] in most circumstances.” See Riego et al., 
supra note 91, at 19. 
 161 Powell, supra note 14, at 704 (citing Lior Jacob Strahilevits, A Social Networks Theo-
ry of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 988 (2005)). 
 162 Id. at 704. 
 163 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (discussing the need for teachers 
and administrators to maintain discipline in the classroom and on school grounds). 
 164 Riego et al., supra note 91, at 19 (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 
(1987)). 
 165 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41. 
 166 Id. at 340. 
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cause requirements do not apply to searches by public school officials.167 In 
delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice White explained the warrant re-
quirement is “unsuited to the school environment,” and requiring public school 
officials “to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infrac-
tion of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the 
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the 
schools.”168 Instead, the Court adopted the “special needs” doctrine.169 Specifi-
cally, the Court has applied this doctrine in situations “[w]here a careful bal-
ancing of governmental and public interests suggest that the public interest is 
best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short 
of probable cause.”170 
Determining the reasonableness of these types of searches requires a twofold 
inquiry: “whether the… action was justified at its inception,” and “whether the 
search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference in the first place.”171 Applying this test 
to searches conducted by public school officials, the first prong is satisfied 
“when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up 
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules 
of the school.”172 The second prong, as the Court has ruled, is satisfied if, once 
initiated, the search is “not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of 
the student and the nature of the infraction.”173 
Forced consent policies employed by public school officials in secondary 
and postsecondary schools do not meet this test. Even though sometimes pub-
lic school officials may suspect that viewing or monitoring a student’s social 
media content would turn up some evidence of wrongdoing,174 the way the 
school officials go about obtaining this information is not justified and is ex-
                                                
 167 See id. (citation omitted) (“The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is 
that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although ‘both the concept of probable cause 
and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search,…in certain limited 
circumstances neither is required.’”). 
 168 Id. 
 169 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353 (White, J., concurring) (“The special need for an immediate 
response to behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or the 
educational process itself justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant 
and probable-cause requirement, and in applying a standard determined by balancing the 
relevant interests.”). 
 170 Id. at 341. 
 171 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
 172 Id. at 342. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See, e.g., id. (discussing reasonable suspicion that the search will show evidence of a 
violation of the law or the rules of the school); see also id. (discussing how the monitoring 
of student-athletes helps ensure that the student-athletes are not saying or doing anything 
that could reflect poorly on the institution). 
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cessively intrusive.175 In secondary institutions, when students are forced by a 
school official to login to their social media account in the presence of the 
school official and allow them to view its contents, what they are at most seek-
ing to find is in no way interfering with the school environment and its ability 
to maintain order.176 School officials, in these situations, are intruding upon 
what a student has deemed private in the sense that a student has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the content of their social media accounts.177 In addi-
tion, the coercive nature of the school officials conduct, in making a student 
come down to an office or be threatened with disciplinary actions if he or she 
does not cooperate, is unreasonable, since the students’ cooperation is done 
unwillingly and involuntarily.178 
In postsecondary schools, “forced consent” policies fail the reasonableness 
test in a different way. In those instances, the level of intrusion is excessive in 
light of the students’ age.179 When in college, a student has typically reached 
the age of majority and their expectation of privacy is fundamentally recog-
nized.180 Unreasonable searches for college students are also not justified.181 By 
requesting a college applicant for his or her login information, the school ad-
ministrators cannot reasonably suspect that the search will turn up evidence 
that the candidate “has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the 
school.”182 This is due to the fact that since these individuals are only appli-
cants, the school has no reason to know whether the prospective student en-
gaged in some wrongdoing.183 A similar argument can be made for student-
athletes.184 Unless the student has given an administrator reasonable grounds 
                                                
 175 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
 176 Id. at 339 (noting the substantial interest of public school officials in maintaining 
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds). Here, the contents of the students’ social 
media accounts are located on the internet and in no way interfere in maintaining order. 
Moreover, since the content is placed on the students’ social media account outside of 
school hours, schools have a far lesser claim to regulating this conduct. R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. 
Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1139 (D. Minn. 2012) (noting 
that out-of-school speech is subject to less stringent school regulation). 
 177 Powell, supra note 14, at 704. 
 178 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973). 
 179 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
 180 Id. at 337-38 (“A search of a child’s person or of a…bag carried on her person, no 
less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of sub-
jective expectations of privacy.”). 
 181 Id. at 342. 
 182 Id. Under these circumstances, college applicants are being subjected to these illegal 
searches based on conduct that the school administrators have no reasonable grounds for 
suspecting have even occurred. 
 183 Id. 
 184 A student-athlete gives school officials no more reason to suspect wrongdoing than 
any other student. Also, the Supreme Court pointed out that students “on the playing field, 
or on the campus . . . may express [their] opinions” so long as [they] do[] not “‘materially 
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for suspecting that the monitoring of their social media account will turn up 
incriminating evidence prior to the monitoring, then the monitoring should not 
be permissible. In this case, anything less than reasonable grounds for suspi-
cion would simply be conjecture.185 
C. Violation of Students’ First Amendment Right to Free Expression 
In addition to violating the Fourth Amendment, “forced consent” policies in-
fringe upon students’ right of free expression under the First Amendment. It 
has long been recognized since the Supreme Court’s holding in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., that students’ First Amendment rights are not 
waived when they enter the school.186 Moreover, in Tinker the Court noted that: 
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in 
school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They are pos-
sessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves 
must respect their obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be regard-
ed as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate. 
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially ap-
proved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regu-
late their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.187 
Although it is true that the rights of students in public schools “are not au-
tomatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,”188 students 
indeed have a constitutional right of freedom of expression that “must be ‘ap-
plied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.’”189 
In Tinker, the Court was ruling on the conduct of a school for punishing stu-
                                                                                                              
and substantially interfer[e] . . . with the . . . operation of the school’” or “collid[e] with the 
rights of others.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 
(1969) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). Moreover, specula-
tion without reasonable suspicion is a constitutionally insufficient reason to search a stu-
dent’s social media posts. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346 (quoting Hill v. Cal., 401 U.S. 797, 
804 (1971)). 
 185 A school administrator cannot go on a fishing expedition. In order to monitor a stu-
dent’s social media posts, the administrator needs more than mere speculation that the 
search will turn up evidence of wrongdoing. A search must be “justified at its inception” and 
actually conducted in a way “reasonably related in scope to [that reason].” T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
at 346 (quoting Hill v. Cal., 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)). “Justified at its inception” requires 
that there be “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that 
the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.” Id. at 341-
42 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). 
 186 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503 (1969; Minnewaska, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1138 (citing Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)) (“For more than forty years, 
the United States courts have recognized that students do not check their First Amendment 
rights at the schoolhouse door.”). 
 187 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
 188 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2007) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
 189 Id. at 397 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)). 
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dents for wearing black armbands that symbolized their disdain for the Vi-
etnam War.190 The Court concluded that a school district could not punish the 
students for wearing the armbands because they did not “materially and sub-
stantially interfere with [the work and discipline of the school].”191 Further-
more, “[i]n our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitar-
ianism,” and students—in and out of school—have a fundamental right to 
freedom of expression of their views.192 
Similar to the facts in Tinker, school officials, through their “forced con-
sent” policies, intend to monitor the students’ social media accounts and then 
penalize them if they refuse to comply or if they find inappropriate content.193 
Generally the content that students post on social networks does not substan-
tially disrupt the work and discipline of the school,194 and if school officials 
have no reason to believe otherwise, there is no legitimate interest in monitor-
ing these activities.195 School officials also lack a legitimate interest when the 
student is only an applicant and does not maintain any legal ties to the 
school.196 In these circumstances, school officials have no just cause to believe 
that the applicant has violated school policy in any way or has made threats of 
                                                
 190 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 191 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 192 Id. at 511 (“Students are ‘persons’ under our Constitution . . . possessed of fundamen-
tal rights which the State must respect.”); see also R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. 
Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1139 (D. Minn. 2012) (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 
U.S. 393, 405 (2007)) (“Out-of-school speech by a student is subject to even less stringent 
school regulation than in-school speech.”). 
 193 For example, in R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. 
Supp. 2d 1128, 1134 (D. Minn. 2012), a school official threatened a student with discipli-
nary action if she refused to comply with the official’s demand to view the content of her 
social media account. Id. The University of Michigan requires its student-athletes to sign a 
social media policy agreement and disciplines violations. Woodhouse, supra note 9. Some 
colleges go much further than Michigan by forcing athletes to allow school officials access 
to their private accounts (such as Utah State University), banning players from using a long 
list of words on Twitter (such as University of Kentucky), or forbidding the student from 
using Twitter altogether. Id. 
 194 Student speech on the Internet is regulated under the same “clearly established gen-
eral principles which have governed schools for decades.” Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 
2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1139. Student speech is constitutionally protected expression—
popular viewpoint or not—unless it would “materially and substantially interfere with the . . 
. operation of the school.” See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 
744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 195 School officials cannot peruse a student’s posts without “reason to believe that [they 
would find] evidence of illegal behavior or violations of school policy.” Minnewaska Area 
Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1143  (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
337, 339, 342 (1985)). 
 196 For an analogous argument in the employment context, see, e.g., Riego et al., supra 
note 91 (discussing the distinction between investigating potential misconduct in the work-
place and searching merely to learn more about the personal characteristics and lifestyle of a 
job applicant). 
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physical violence, for which the First Amendment would offer no protection.197 
The same should be said for students in secondary schools and student-
athletes.198 Therefore, penalizing the student for not disclosing their social me-
dia account information violates the students’ right to free expression under the 
First Amendment.199 
VII. HOW STUDENTS’ RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND FREE 
EXPRESSION CAN BE UPHELD 
Because these “forced consent” policies are an issue in our educational sys-
tem, counteractive solutions should exist in order to prevent these problems 
from reoccurring. Three possible solutions that would help battle against these 
social media policies are discussed below. 
A. Legislative Enactments Prohibiting the Monitoring of Students Social 
Media Accounts 
One solution that would remedy these forms of social media policies is for 
state legislators to enact statutes that expressly prohibit this conduct. On July 
20, 2012, the Delaware state legislature passed the Education Privacy Act, 
“[prohibiting] university officials from forcing students to disclose digitally 
protected information.”200 Specifically, this law addresses privacy concerns of 
students and offers protections for both “students and applicants” at post-
                                                
 197 Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1139. 
 198 Whether a student “on the campus” or an athlete “on the playing field,” he is free to 
express his opinion so long as he does not “‘materially and substantially interfer[e] . . . with 
the . . . operation of the school’” or “collid[e] with the rights of others.” Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 
363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). “[S]chool officials may not simply ‘reach out to discov-
er, monitor, or punish any type of out of school speech.’” Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 
2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 (citing D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 
60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
 199 “[S]tudents are ‘persons’ under our Constitution . . . possessed of fundamental rights . 
. . [and] may not be confined to [officially approved] expression[s].” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
511. Furthermore, all out-of-school statements “are protected under the First Amendment 
and not punishable by school authorities unless they are true threats or are reasonably calcu-
lated to reach the school environment and are so egregious as to pose a serious safety risk or 
other substantial disruption in that environment.” Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 
894 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (emphasis in original). Punishing students for not disclosing their 
social media account information without reasonable suspicion they have violated a law or 
school rule is akin to “school officials . . . ‘reach[ing] out to discover, monitor, [and] punish 
any type of out of school speech.’” Id. at 1139. 
 200 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22; H.B. 309, 146th Gen. Assemb., Second Reg. Sess. 
(Del. 2012). 
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secondary educational institutions throughout the State.201 The necessity for 
this protection stems from the “current trend” for Americans to engage in these 
forms of online communication.202 
Delaware legislators have recognized that 75% of adults, ages eighteen to 
twenty-four, and 56% of adults, between the ages of twenty-five to thirty-four, 
have a social media account.203 In addition, the state legislature recognized that 
young Americans use these various social media accounts for personal use in 
“maintaining community contacts and content sharing [which] are currently 
more prevalent than professional uses.”204 Also, Delaware legislators recognize 
the tendency for youth to use social networks “as a primary vehicle for effect-
ing positive social and political change . . . establish[ing] social networks as 
the new digital age ‘public square’ for important discourse.”205 Moreover, a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their social 
media accounts.206 Other states have enacted similar legislation to protect the 
privacy rights of students.207 However, thus far, only Michigan has taken into 
consideration the privacy rights of students in secondary schools.208 
Another solution would be for federal legislators to enact a statute to protect 
the privacy rights of students. Congressman Eliot Engel, Congresswoman Jan 
Schakowsky, and Congressman Michael Grim have taken initial steps to 
achieve such a federal privacy statute.209 These members of congress have in-
troduced the Social Networking Online Protection Act, (“SNOPA”), that 
would protect users of social networking who are “employed or enrolled, and 
those seeking employment or admittance, or those facing disciplinary action, 
from being required to give passwords or other information used to access their 
[social media] accounts.”210 In Congressman Engel’s view, it is erroneous to 
justify the conduct of institutions that demand private social media account 
                                                
 201 H.B. 309, 146th Gen. Assemb., Second Reg. Sess. (Del. 2012). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. (alteration in original). 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id.; Salem, supra note 27. 
 207 Salem, supra note 27 (“[S]ix states [have enacted or] will enact the social media pri-
vacy acts.”). 
 208 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.271-.2075, at 37.272(b) (2012) (“‘Educational institu-
tion’ . . . includes . . . secondary school . . . [and] shall be construed broadly to include pub-
lic and private institutions of higher education to the greatest extent consistent with constitu-
tional limitations.”). 
 209 See Reps. Engel, Schakowsky, Grimm Seek to Protect Online Content (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://commcns.org/1fnw2vC. 
 210 See id. (alteration in original) (“The bill would prohibit current or potential employers 
or education institutions from requiring a username, password or other access to online con-
tent, or disciplining, discriminating, or denying employment to individuals, or punish them 
for refusing to volunteer such information.”). 
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information because the information was placed online.211 Besides, when laws 
are silent in “prohibiting institutions from requiring this information, it be-
comes a common practice.”212 
B. Proposed Model Statute for Education Privacy Laws 
As a means of protecting students in both secondary and postsecondary edu-
cational institutions, this Comment proposes that state legislators either enact 
or amend their statutes, similar to the Delaware statute,213 to prohibit public and 
private educational institutions,214 “and their employees and representatives,” 
from requiring or requesting from “a student, prospective student, or student 
group to disclose their personal social media information.”215 The statutes will 
also prohibit an academic institution from penalizing or refusing to admit an 
applicant as a result of the student or applicant’s refusal to disclose their social 
media information.216 
Any new statutes should also extend privacy rights to students in secondary 
schools because high school students are the primary users of these social me-
dia networks.217 Currently, the Delaware statute defines “Academic institution” 
as a “public or nonpublic institution of higher education or institution of post-
secondary education.”218 However, this does not take into account that there is 
a large population of children ages 11 to 18 that also use social media sites to 
interact with friends and family.219 By doing so, this will avoid vagueness and 
place institutions on notice that similar conduct is also prohibited. Further-
                                                
 211 See id. 
 212 See id. 
 213 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 8102-104 (2012). 
 214 Because private institutions are not state actors, they are typically not subject to 
claims regarding unconstitutional restrictions on students’ free speech. Jamie P. Hopkins et 
al. supra note 105, at 32. 
 215 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99121 (2012); see DEL. CODE ANN. § 8103 (2012); Molly 
DiBianca, NJ Passes Password-Protection Law for Employees and Students, DELAWARE 
EMPLOYMENT LOG BLOG (Oct. 30, 2012), http://commcns.org/1blNj9b. As of February 16, 
2013, there are only four states that prohibit school officials in postsecondary institutions 
from requiring students to disclose any social media account information. See Christina 
Farr, Michigan Passes Internet Privacy Act to Protect Students and Employees, VENTURE-
BEAT (Dec. 30, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://commcns.org/MQ2ZJp; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 
99121 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. § 8103 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.271-
.275 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3-30-18A:3-31 (2012). 
 216 See DEL. CODE ANN. § 8104 (2012). 
 217 However, in Delaware, the provision that protected students in secondary institutions 
was removed from the Higher Education Privacy Act over concerns that it would protect 
bullies. See Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22. 
 218 DEL. CODE ANN. § 8102 (2012). 
 219 Lauren Fisher, SIMPLY ZESTY (Sept. 23, 2011), http://commcns.org/1kBBjDl (86% of 
children use social media to build their personal brand.). 
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more, by enacting these new statutes, it will prohibit school officials from as-
serting qualified immunity to avoid liability for this conduct.220 
C. Ruling from the Judicial System 
The District Courts are split in deciding whether a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their use of social media accounts.221 In United States 
v. Meregildo, the district court noted that “[w]hen a social media user dissemi-
nates his postings and information to the public, they are not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.”222  However, the Meregildo court also recognized that 
when a person uses a more secure privacy setting, it shows “the user’s intent to 
preserve information as private” and may be protected under the Fourth 
Amendment.223 
In R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, the district court 
also held that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her 
social media content.224 In this case, the court dealt with a school official’s de-
mands for access to a student’s social media accounts to show inappropriate 
conduct.225 Furthermore, the court found that the school official’s conduct vio-
lated the student’s right to privacy.226 In addition, the court found that the 
school official’s conduct violated the student’s right to free expression because 
the school officials sought to penalize the student for the content of her social 
media account.227 
Without a statute enacted by a state or the federal legislature, the only way 
to prohibit the conduct of school officials in secondary and postsecondary in-
stitutions from requesting the social media account information from its stu-
dents is for the United States Supreme Court to make a ruling on the constitu-
                                                
 220 Hudson, Jr., supra note 7, at 22. 
 221 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 222 United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (2012) (citing Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In this case, the Government learned that the defendant 
posted messages on Facebook regarding prior acts of violence, threatened new violence to 
rival gang members, and sought allegiance from his fellow gang members. Id. at 526. Law 
enforcement officers accessed the defendant’s profile through a person who was a “friend” 
to the defendant’s profile page. Id. 
 223 Id. at 525 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)). The district 
court also determined that the Government does not violate the Fourth Amendment when 
the Government accesses the content through a cooperating witness who is a “friend.” Id. at 
526. 
 224 R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 
1142 (D. Minn. 2012). 
 225 Id. at 1134. 
 226 Id. at 1142. 
 227 Id. at 1138-39. 
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tionality of these “forced consent” policies.228 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Incidents like the one in Minnesota involving a twelve-year-old student have 
begun to arouse interest throughout the United States.229 As a result of this new 
found attention, state legislatures have begun to enact new laws that prohibit 
these “forced consent” policies from taking place in educational institutions 
and to protect the rights of students to be free from this governmental intrusion 
into their daily lives.230 Although there has been a small movement of states to 
ensure the privacy protections of students,231 more states need to take action 
and pass legislation on their own accord. More importantly, these states need 
to expand upon the scope of these protections to include students from both 
secondary and postsecondary schools, private and public.232 
It is critical to have uniform legislation prohibiting these forced consent pol-
icies because it will prevent situations where students are made to choose be-
tween cooperation and embarrassment,233 or between cooperation and penaliza-
tion.234 It is not fair to subject young adults, let alone children, to restrictions 
and violations of their fundamental right to free expression,235 or their right to 
privacy.236 If these proposed amendments and enactments had been in place in 
Minnesota, then that twelve-year-old girl would not have suffered embarrass-




                                                
 228 Because there has only been one case in the United States district courts reviewing 
the constitutionality of conduct by school officials that demand the social media account 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Proposed Amendment to West’s Delaware Code Annotated § 8102 Defini-
tions 
 
(a) “Academic institution” means public or nonpublic academic institution, 
and includes an institution of secondary education and an institution of 
higher education or institution of postsecondary education. 
 
(b) “Applicant” means a prospective student applying for admission into the 
subject academic institution. 
 
(c) “Electronic communication device” means a cell telephone, personal dig-
ital assistant, electronic device with mobile data access, laptop computer, 
pager, broadband personal communication device whether mobile or desk-
top, 2-way messaging device, electronic game, or portable computing de-
vice. 
 
(d) “Social networking site” means an Internet-based, personalized, privacy-
protected website or application whether free or commercial that allows us-
ers to construct a private or semi-private profile site within a bounded sys-
tem, create a list of other system users who are granted reciprocal access to 
the individual’s profile site, send and receive email, and share personal con-
tent, communications, and contacts. 
 
(e) “Student” means a person whom, at all relevant times, is admitted into 
the academic institution. 
 
 
 
